Blake Lively faces a defamation lawsuit filed by I. Wallace in the Western District of Texas (Case No. 1:25-cv-00163). However, a close review of the amended complaint reveals significant weaknesses that strongly favor Lively’s legal team. The allegations appear vague, speculative, and procedurally vulnerable, making an early dismissal highly likely.

First, the lawsuit suffers from a critical lack of specificity. Wallace vaguely references “additional defamatory remarks” allegedly made by Lively without identifying the exact words spoken or the context in which they were said. Courts consistently require defamation plaintiffs to state the alleged defamatory statements with particularity. Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, complaints must offer plausible factual allegations, not broad conclusions or speculative assertions. Pleading “on information and belief” without corroborating facts is insufficient. Without quoting the alleged defamatory remarks, Wallace’s claim risks immediate dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Second, Wallace attempts to argue that Lively’s alleged refusal to retract statements amounts to defamation. This argument lacks legal support. Silence, or even a refusal to disavow prior remarks, does not create a new defamatory statement unless a legal duty to correct exists, which Wallace does not and cannot establish. Mere failure to respond to public criticism—such as hashtags like “Blake Lies” or “Justice for Justin”—does not give rise to defamation liability.

Third, under Texas law, Lively has access to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), the state’s strong anti-SLAPP statute. The TCPA requires the filing of a motion to dismiss within 60 days of service and shifts the burden to the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of defamation supported by clear and specific evidence. Wallace’s vague and conclusory complaint will struggle to meet that standard.

Additionally, Wallace states that “discovery will reveal the extent of those statements,” a tactic courts are skeptical of. Plaintiffs must plead a plausible claim before gaining access to expansive discovery. Courts disfavor fishing expeditions where plaintiffs hope that information uncovered later will justify a weak complaint.

Blake Lively also possesses strong substantive defenses. Truth is an absolute defense to defamation. If any of the statements were factually accurate or substantially true, Wallace’s claims collapse immediately. Moreover, if the dispute touches on matters of public concern—such as the broader controversy around “Justice for Justin”—Lively’s speech is protected by heightened First Amendment standards under New York Times v. Sullivan. In that case, Wallace would have to prove actual malice, a daunting burden requiring evidence that Lively either knew the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.

Finally, Wallace’s choice of forum raises jurisdictional issues. Attempts to establish Texas jurisdiction based on vague and indirect contacts with the state are unlikely to succeed against an out-of-state defendant like Lively. Personal jurisdiction challenges could independently end the case before discovery even begins.

In sum, the Wallace complaint looks destined for failure. It hinges on unspecific allegations, misunderstandings of defamation law, and jurisdictional overreach. Lively’s legal team can move swiftly with a well-crafted motion to dismiss or a TCPA motion, putting immediate pressure on Wallace to substantiate claims that appear facially deficient.

For Blake Lively, the lawsuit appears more nuisance than legitimate threat.